Cyber Attacks

Application of Deception and Separation At National Level
The principle of deception entails a thoughtful introduction of ambiguous functionality or distortion into the country’s infrastructure with the intent of misleading the intruder. In contrast, the principle of separation entails enforcement of restrictions on access policies to the users and the resources within the computing surrounding. In deception, interface elements or components should be availed for the individual drive of fakery. At the national level, the functionality applicable would be honey pot. Deception has been used by law enforcement organizations for numerous years in catching the cyber stalkers and convicts through deceiving the identity reported at the endpoint (Amoroso, 2013).
The first tactics are authenticating and management of identities: these approaches are applied in validating and managing the identities through which decision of separation are made. Besides the external attacks, for instance, DDOS is not affected by authenticating and management of identity (Clark, Berson & Lin, 2014). The access controls are inherent in the operation of the system and its application to offer separation level despite the fact that they are also weak upon compromised insiders. Thirdly is the use of LAN controls, where access controls on components of LAN. Finally, is the use of firewalls for the purpose of separating one network to another. Firewalls are useful with the connectivity of most individuals to the internet. For the national level, they should implement such that usage of firewalls in safeguarding known perimeter gateways.
In the case of national infrastructure protection, the principle of separation may be applied through numerous mechanisms. The utilization of network-based firewalls is a prerequisite for numerous applications at national infrastructure, specifically to those susceptible to DDOS attacks emanating from the internet. Secondly is the utilization of the firewalls for the purpose of segregating and isolating the internal components of the infrastructure. This simplifies the implementation policies of the access control in the corporation. Finally, is the utilization of commercial off-the-shelf firewalls, specifically the SCADA usage, which necessitates the firewall tailoring to the needs of the exceptional protocol for the applications (Tabansky,2011). One should not use generic, commercial, off-the-shelf tools. This methodology scales well and assists in dealing with unrestrained complexities found in the national infrastructure. Systems that necessitates network-based tactics to work appropriately in the national infrastructure include intrusion systems for detection, antivirus filtering, management of threats as well as denial of service filtering (Amoroso, 2013).
Stages of Deception
The first stage is the scanning stage, where the adversary searches for all exploitable entry levels using any means or resources possible. The presupposition at this phase is the service interface entails trap functionality, for instance, fake links on proxied sites, which leads to a honey pot for collection of information. Within the national level, this phase entails the rival looking for any entry points to the system, for instance, in safes, relations, contracts, locked cabinets and even processes. Thus, it involves both computing and non-computing process in search of information about a potential entry. The second stage is the discovery phase, where the rival discovers an entry point that is exploitable and can be either real or fake. Assuming that the susceptibility is factual, then back-end security should be in place to avert infrastructural disaster. The main objective is to make the adversary have the perception that the real susceptibility could be real or bogus. This is employed through sponsoring and funding for unsystematic research and development. Secondly, it can be through open publications of similar studies where deception was applied at the national level.
The third stage would be the exploitation stage, where the adversary utilizes the vulnerability for their purposes. If the susceptibility is real, then it results in infrastructure trespass. In this phase, there is available data for forensic analysis. At the national level, the laws or the policy rules are violated, creating a cyber-attack. Reducing the trigger points when the warnings portray false positives can be detrimental to the organization. Real assets must be separated and safeguarded to avert honey pot trap compromising. The final stage is exposing phase where the enemy behavioral attributes are conspicuous for observation. In this phase, honey pots comprise of adequate monitoring in order to determine the technique, purpose and the identity of the intruder (Amoroso, 2013). The monitoring should be done devoid of conscious of the intruder.